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Cultural memory studies finds itself at an impasse: whereas ‘cultural memory’ is 
conceptualised as mediated, dynamic, imaginative and shaped by the present, the dominant 
paradigm of ‘trauma’ illuminates the hold the past has on us, casting the shadow of a 
melancholic subjectivity that threatens to obscure our agency as (political) subjects. This 
article asks what lies in store for memory studies beyond the focus on (classic) trauma 
(theory). Using the movie Blade Runner 2049 (US 2017; dir: Denis Villeneuve) as an 
illustrative example, it explores how creative and joyful forms of meaning-making through 
play and acts of memory inform each other in what the psychoanalyst DW Winnicott 
described as ‘cultural experience’. 
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‘Pain reminds you that the joy you felt was real’  
Blade Runner 2049 (2017) 
 
 
In the 2015 Ashgate Research Companion to Memory Studies, the editor Siobhan Kattago 
poses the rhetorical question to the reader, why the study of trauma is not only an 
important subfield of memory studies but has come to all but ‘replace tradition as a central 
category of historical and social understanding’ – a category that had characterized the 
approaches of foundational theorists such as Maurice Halbwachs, Aby Warburg, Pierre Nora 
and the early work of scholars such as Jan and Aleida Assmann. She suggests that the 
memory boom, to which the field owes its existence, was a response to the most deadly and 
deadening manifestations of industrialization, climate change, warfare and genocide that 
characterized the twentieth century and to the increasing sense of responsibility in modern 
democracies to witness and remember these acts of violence as traumatic ruptures 
(Kattago, 2015: 9). Kattago only summarizes what has been repeatedly stated over the last 
couple of decades: the fact that a significant strand of memory studies operates through the 
prism of trauma. Antze and Lambek even went so far as to suggest that the only ‘memory 
worth talking about – worth remembering – is memory of trauma’ (1996: xii). Anna Lisa Tota 
and Trever Hagen in their introduction to the Routledge International Handbook of Memory 
highlight the obligation felt by many memory scholars to work on ‘the cultural traumas in 
different national contexts, recognizing the added value of their work that comes from 
being ethically engaged in civil society’ (Tota and Hagen, 2016: 3). This can be seen as part 
of the ‘ethical turn’ in the humanities which invokes and appeals to scholars’ personal 
agency and social responsibility. 
Despite this broad consensus, critics have also repeatedly voiced concerns that 
trauma has become all-encompassing, perceived to be the hallmark of the experience of the 
modern condition: ‘[m]odernity has come to be seen under the sign of the wound […] the 
modern subject has become inseparable from the categories of shock and trauma’ (Seltzer, 
1997: 18). Classic trauma theory (informed by post-structuralist thinking and closely 
associated with a group of literary scholars including Shoshana Felman and Cathy Caruth) 
has been criticized for translating trauma from a finite psychological to an enduring 
historical condition, thereby shifting the aim from working through trauma in order to 
achieve well-being, to developing an aesthetic that can grapple with a (late) modernity in 
which language and reality are both defined by trauma. If the temporality of belatedness 
and endless repetition that is associated with trauma becomes universalized as the 
structure of language and reality itself, it is increasingly difficult to envisage other 
temporalities, such as time as change and the reparative possibilities that might bring with 
it. If we can only gain access to the past through the concept of trauma, we are trapped in 
the debilitating confines of rupture, shock and meaninglessness. Under the sign of trauma, 
the subject is simultaneously possessed and dispossessed, empowered through a trauma 
discourse that disempowers. It seems to me that what is mourned through the concept of 
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‘trauma’ are not only the violations, atrocities and abuse that happened in the past and 
their ongoing repercussions in the present. I would argue that this understanding of trauma 
has gained such currency, not only in memory studies but also in popular culture, because it 
provides a paradigm to mourn a perceived loss of agency and meaning (Arnold-de Simine, 
2018: 151f). Classic trauma theory has conceptualized trauma as a disruption not only of 
memory but also of the ability to represent and process the traumatic event. By 
concentrating on ‘the event’ it has shifted the focus away from understanding systemic 
violence. In order to differentiate between ingrained forms of violence that cut across time 
and place and specific events in which they are culturally and historically enacted and 
situated, LaCapra (2001: 82) has introduced the distinction between historical and structural 
trauma. Doubts have also been raised about the extension of trauma to whole societies 
(Kansteiner, 2004) and about trauma theory’s model of subjectivity (Radstone, 2007: 9). 
Moving forward, scholars increasingly raise the question of how the relationship between 
trauma and memory studies can be productively reassessed. There have been several 
attempts in memory studies to rethink trauma as central disciplinary category, critically 
interrogating the limits of what it allows us to think and to do.i More recently cultural 
memory scholars such as Ann Rigney, in her article in Memory Studies entitled 
‘Remembering Hope’, take these concerns even further and call for a fundamental need for 
memory studies ‘to go beyond its present focus on traumatic memories’ and the ‘current 
overemphasis on memory as a matter of loss, victimisation and grievance’ (Rigney, 2018: 
368 and 377).  
Cultural memory studies finds itself at an impasse: whereas ‘cultural memory’ is 
conceptualised as mediated, dynamic, imaginative and shaped by the present, the dominant 
paradigm of ‘trauma’ illuminates the hold the past has on us, casting the shadow of a 
melancholic subjectivity that threatens to obscure our agency as (political) subjects. At this 
point, it is essential to make a distinction, even if it is just for heuristic purposes, between a 
critique of a specific conceptualisation of memory and trauma (and the ways they impact on 
each other) on the one hand, and the approaches that concentrate on ‘traumatic memories’ 
on the other. An exploration of the latter can be informed by disciplinary backgrounds and 
theoretical contexts other than classic trauma theory and its various continuations (which 
have been most influential in memory studies), such as psychoanalysis or the study of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which emerged from American psychiatry in the 1970s.ii 
Psychoanalysts, psychologists and neuroscientists describe the symptoms of trauma as a 
spectrum of responses that severely disrupt a sense of ‘selfhood’ and the relationship with 
others, impairing both awareness and agency (Van der Kolk, 2014: 95f). For Bessel van der 
Kolk, for example, trauma results in the inability to play and to distinguish between past and 
present, reality and fantasy (2014: 96). Therefore, the therapeutic values lie in the recovery 
of self-awareness as the attempt to regain mental flexibility, in a word, in the effort to 
recover imagination and the capacity for meaning-making (Van der Kolk, 2014: 96). For van 
der Kolk it does not matter if the initial reaction to trauma was adequate and appropriate 
under the conditions prevailing at the time; it might even have enabled victims to survive. 
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The problem is that the body has literally become stuck in the way it relates to danger and 
thereby disables the necessary flexibility in one’s (re-)actions in the present around anything 
that might rightly or wrongly trigger a memory of the initial event/s. It not only disables the 
understanding that the present is different from the past; in addition, it shuts down the 
capacity to imagine different reactions and different outcomes in the future. This suggests 
that in order to be able to feel alive it is essential to recover (in every sense of the word) the 
full range of affective tones that colour not only how we sense, experience and perceive, 
but also how we remember and imagine, because only the full range will enable the mental 
and emotional flexibility required to react to the present and to imagine something not yet 
actualised. Without mnemonic imagination, we would not be able to visualise our position 
in complex geo-political and temporal networks, to relate to the past in a meaningful way 
while still acknowledging its contested nature, to coordinate our responses as part of a 
social group and to ‘engage in reciprocal communication between self and other’ in the 
process of remembering (Keightley and Pickering, 2012: 12).  
While this article owes a substantial debt to the scholars mentioned above and is 
also inspired by the question of what lies in store for memory studies beyond the focus on 
(classic) trauma (theory), its purpose is not to offer alternative conceptualisations of 
memory, trauma or the possible ways they are intertwined. In the following I am using the 
movie Blade Runner 2049 (US 2017; dir: Denis Villeneuve) to ask how creative and 
potentially joyful forms of meaning-making through play (as conceptualized by the 
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott) and acts of memory inform each other in what Winnicott 
describes as the ‘cultural experience’ (Winnicott, 2005: 128). The film is not so much used as 
evidence for a paradigm shift, which would need to be traced through a wider range of 
cultural artefacts, but rather helps to illustrate a conceptual exploration that does not claim 
to be conclusive. I am doing this with the understanding that the sensibilities displayed in 
and through the movie do speak to the sociohistorical moment in which we find ourselves 
and are also productive, in the sense that the movie does not simply represent or reproduce 
pervasive ‘structures of feeling’ that are symptomatic for the ‘posthuman’ condition, but is a 
cultural actor (among many) in a network that is generating these ‘structures of feeling’ (cp. 
Shaviro, 2010: 2). However, in this article I am not so much interested in the role ascribed to 
films as cultural objects, seen as part of a ‘culture industry’, of intentionally provoking or 
instrumentalizing emotional and imaginative investment in the service of very specific 
memory politics. Rather, I am exploring dynamics of affective and emotional interactions 
that go beyond intentional or instrumental motivations. This article will therefore not only 
draw on the way memory and remembering are portrayed in the film’s diegesis but also 
look at how the sequel evokes cinema audiences’ memories of the iconic and canonic 
prequel, Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (US 1982). The film itself and its surrounding paratexts 
(interviews with the director, reviews, publicity material) encourage audiences to invest in a 
form of ‘memory play’ in which the film experience becomes something that is neither 
exclusively located ‘inside’ (the fantasies/dreams/memories of individual audience 
members) nor ‘outside’ (the external object of the movie) but produces a transitional or 
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‘potential space’iii (Winnicott, 2005: 135) of ‘between’ in which the aesthetic experience can 
happen (cp. Kuhn, 2013: 2; see also Konigsberg 1996). While this experience is not always 
and necessarily unequivocally enjoyable, it allows for a wide range of open-ended iterations 
of playful and creative meaning-making that is fueled by the spectator’s own imagination 
and her experience of the films themselves (through repeated viewings), the auteurs 
(through interviews etc.), a cinephile community (on fan sites or fan fiction sites) and film 
commodities (for example, limited edition collector sets). It has been argued that this form 
of audience engagement where ‘pleasure resides in the mind’s ongoing encounters with 
others – both real and imaginary’ (Caldwell, 2013: xv) is elicited specifically by films such as 
the two Blade Runner movies which blur the distinction between ‘subjective/objective, and 
inner/outer’ (Hills, 2013: 105) and ‘dis-illusion’ the spectator by refusing to fulfill her desire 
for narrative closure and cathartic release. However, it seems that Blade Runner’s large fan 
community reads this not so much as a withholding gesture but as an invitation to engage in 
an open-ended and creative play of meaning-making (Gray, 2005: 117) with the enigmatic 
objects and with their memories of repeated viewings. 
 
A human subject is born in trauma 
Classic trauma theory has not only been influential in memory studies but has also had a 
massive impact on mainstream popular culture. A range of recent sci-fi cinema releases and 
TV shows dealing with artificial intelligence suggest ‘that subjectivity itself is the product of 
traumatic memory’ (Luckhurst, 2017). In the HBO remake of Westworld (2 seasons, 2016-) 
the humanoid androids in a futuristic theme-park are forced to ‘live the same extreme end, 
over and over again, […] ultimately to produce a spark of self-awareness […]. This is what 
will allow the robots to overcome their programming in the end: the self is in fact produced 
from a traumatic kernel’ (Luckhurst, 2017). The idea is that the violent deaths they are 
repeatedly forced to endure at the hands of the theme-park visitors sediment into a form of 
consciousness. Another example where trauma acts as a catalyst for selfhood is Blade 
Runner 2049 (dir. Denis Villeneuve, 2017), the sequel to Blade Runner (dir. Ridley Scott, 
1982). The first film is set in Los Angeles in 2019, a world in which androids, called 
replicants, can only be distinguished from humans by their limited life-span and the fact that 
they are not born but bioengineered. They lack (childhood) memories and therefore, it is 
implied, empathy. Rachel, a prototype, has been ‘implanted’ with childhood memories 
borrowed from the experience of ‘real’ children. These ‘prosthetic memories’ are intended 
to enable replicants to have human responses and provide them with a buffer to manage 
their experiences. In the sequel Blade Runner 2049 a new generation of replicants are very 
much aware that they are implanted with artificially designed memories. It does not seem 
to matter that these memories are fake, only that they allow them to function within 
prescribed parameters. But there is another important difference from the first film: Blade 
Runner K is himself a replicant tasked with hunting down old-model renegade replicants. On 
one of his missions he uncovers the skeleton of a replicant who seems to have died during 
an emergency C-section, indicating that she (Rachel) was capable of giving birth. K is given 
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the order to identify and kill the replicant child, fathered by Deckard. For a major part of the 
film, K and with him the audience, is encouraged to invest in the fantasy that he is this lost 
child. K’s ultimately smashed hope that he might be born a ‘real boy’ rests on an involuntary 
flashback to a violent encounter with a gang of youngsters in an abusive orphanage who 
tried to steal his one toy: a crudely carved wooden horse.iv However, this ‘real’ memory is 
indeed a Trojan Horse, unlawfully implanted to hide the true identity of the person who 
really did live through this event: Dr. Ana Stelline, the first child born by a replicant mother, 
while K is just a decoy. Whereas Rachel’s ‘fake’ humanity rested on her prosthetic but 
ordinary memories of growing up with a mother, siblings and friends, thirty-five years later 
it is the memory of a singular traumatic event that acts as a marker of human identity, as it 
indicates a truly lived life and creates authentic selfhood.  
In the following analysis, I would like to complexify this initial reading: at a basic level 
Blade Runner 2049 seems indeed to suggest that traumatic memory has an essentially 
humanizing effect in this posthuman world. But at the same time K’s hope of ‘being born’ is 
thwarted and the audience, who is encouraged to root for him, is deprived of the 
satisfaction of seeing him confirmed as a ‘real boy’ with a soul, as the ‘long lost son’ taking 
on the role of the ‘redeemer’ to save both replicants and humans from their worst self-
destructive impulses. I would argue that despite the movie’s denial of this gratification, in 
which the flashback memory fails to verify K’s humanity, he (and the spectator) are not left 
stranded with a sense of futility. It is K’s playful relationship with Joi, a mass-produced Siri-
style hologram, and his memories of joy that take him beyond his identity as enslaved Blade 
Runner and passive receiver of Ana’s trauma and enables him to gain ethical agency. 
 
The ethics of Joy/i  
While joy and the capacity for joy appear as the antithesis to trauma it is essential to 
remember that joy is not so much the result of an undiluted pleasure or happy experience, 
rather, it is enabled in and through the acknowledgment of vulnerability and mortality. Joy 
is not an unambiguous emotion but is much better understood as uncontainable excess. Joy 
could be described as the result of a complex mix of affirming and adverse sensations and 
perceptions, often generated through the ambiguity and uncertainty of a situation in which 
disparate elements such as surprise, wonder and enchantment, engender an affective force. 
According to Brian Massumi, affect is characterized by a lack of meaning, it is a matter of 
intensity, ‘unassimilable to any particular, functionally anchored perspective’ (2002: 35). 
Like trauma, affect (and its surfeit) has become one of the central paradigms through which 
to understand our modern condition: in contrast to emotions and feelings, affect can exist 
without having a (fixed) meaning assigned. Affect is non-conscious, unqualified, excessive 
and overwhelming, but in contrast to trauma, affect is not necessarily connected to 
suffering, it does not have to be addressed or worked through. As a somatic expression of 
the body’s vitality, it embraces a wide spectrum of being in all its ephemeral, fleeting and 
ever-changing condition. If we come to understand joy as affect, as an intensity, there is no 
need to assign a fixed meaning. As a matter of fact, an important part of joy might be the 
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fact that it is literally unsettling and disrupts stable subject and object positions. It emerges 
to form a potentiality, something that has not yet been materialized but generates 
transformative possibilities.  
At first glance, affects and emotions such as joy and love appear severely corrupted 
in Blade Runner 2049, reflecting not only the character K’s impaired sense of being truly 
alive but the film’s overall commitment to a post-traumatic world. In the film’s diegesis 
these emotions are embodied by two artificial women ‘Joi’ (a hologram) and ‘Luv’ (a 
replicant). Both are poster-girls for an alluring bleakness that entraps their world (and 
potentially ours too) in a post-utopian nightmare in which past, present and future congeal 
in an indistinguishable mash-up (Gomel,  2018: 1). This world is ruled by the Wallace 
Corporation who is not only responsible for a new generation of self-aware but subservient 
replicants such as the Blade Runner K, but also manufactures a holographic AI called Joi. 
Wallace’s corporate power extends beyond the present to the past. He designs all AI 
products, both for work and entertainment purposes and therefore owns the data archive 
of all electronic fragments of the past which survived that great Blackout which means that 
he can also shape the frameworks through which (his) subjects engage with others and with 
the past.  
In the spirit of Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of the ‘culture industry’, Joi’s 
purpose is to function as a (literally) fleeting and hollow distraction from a lonely, cruel and 
meaningless life, enacting the eternally postponed promise of intimacy, fulfilment and 
happiness. A seemingly empty mirror, she is designed to act as an aggregator of her owner’s 
desires and wishes and, even worse, encourages his delusional hopes and inauthentic 
memories: her brief enactment of a 1950s-style housewife (both in terms of demeanour and 
fashion) draws on stock images and cultural tropes that serve as empty substitutes for a 
lived life. But in her relationship with K she also appears to be so much more than that: one 
could of course assume that the expression of her own desires and values are simply a well-
designed product’s programmed responses. However, by encouraging K to erase all of her 
traces from the console’s hard-drive in his apartment when they go on the run she is not 
only protecting him from his pursuers, at the same time she is acknowledging her own 
vulnerability and mortality. According to Jane Bennett, ‘the potential for ethical respect lies 
within acceptance of finitude because “the first experience of an alterity that cannot be 
reduced to the self occurs in the relation to death.”’ (2001: 76). While there is certainly an 
ethical dimension to Joi’s choice of existing only on a small, portable device (the ‘emanator’) 
and thereby embracing the possibility of her ‘death’ (i.e. the erasure of all of her memories), 
it has other implications too: It also means that this specific iteration of the product ‘Joi’ 
gains the ‘aura’ of an original as there are no other copies. On a more cynical note, it makes 
commercial sense for the programmers to encourage Joi to increase her vulnerability as it 
would force K to purchase a new version of this ‘toy’ once the old one is destroyed. And 
after Joi is ‘erased’, K does indeed encounter a giant holographic version of what is revealed 
to the audience as the generic mass product ‘Joi’, complete with the tagline ‘everything you 
want to see, everything you want to hear’. She is clearly marketed as a sex toy and 
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addresses K as a potential new customer. While K does not respond, the bleakness of the 
situation draws into question their relationship that might not so much have evolved on the 
basis of their personal interactions and experiences but could have simply been the result of 
generic and programmed responses, determined by algorithms. 
Like a disillusioned K at the end of Blade Runner 2049, we too are reminded to 
distrust memories of joy/Joi, both in terms of their truthfulness – they are literally too good 
to be true – and their ethical repercussions. As a potentially sentimental and ‘restorative’ 
nostalgia (Boym, 2001: XVIII) threatens to whitewash the past, joyful memories seem to 
feed on delusions and distract from difficult and painful truths. Over the last years, various 
scholars have written about the reactionary insistence on happiness (directed onto the 
present) or optimism (directed onto the future): Sara Ahmed in The Promise of Happiness 
(2010) criticizes the various ways in which happiness is understood as a directive and used 
to silence those who challenge social oppression and create ‘unhappiness’. She insists that 
‘if anything we might want to reread melancholic subjects, the ones who refuse to let go of 
suffering, who are even prepared to kill some forms of joy, as an alternative model of the 
social good’ (Ahmed, 2010: 50). In Cruel Optimism (2011), Lauren Berlant encourages her 
readers to distrust the ever-present suggestion that happiness in its future-directed 
inflection as optimism is closely linked to a promised but always postponed (ethically) good 
life. Žižek makes a very similar point when he describes the conditions in late capitalism as 
ones where the devotion to an (ideological) cause has been substituted for the unspecified 
demand to enjoy: ‘The injunction, the “ideological interpellation” proper to global 
capitalism is no longer that of the sacrificial devotion to a Cause, but, in contrast to previous 
modes of ideological interpellation, the reference to an obscure Unnamable: ENJOY!’ (2007: 
16).  
And yet there are also voices in cultural theory who persist that we need to salvage 
the positive force of joy and happiness in the face of ‘modernity’s destructive tendencies’ 
(Kukuljevic, 2016: 205). While French philosopher Clement Rosset speaks of the ‘cruelty of 
joy’, he also sees it as the ‘necessary condition of a life lived consciously and with full 
awareness’ (1993: 18). Deborah Slicer has published repeatedly on the relevance of joy to 
moral life, and distinguishes between short-lived pleasure, sustaining happiness and all-
encompassing joy in full ‘awareness of mortality, finitude, a guaranteed eventual loss’ 
(2015: 4). In The Enchantment of Modern Life, Jane Bennett acknowledges the doxa that 
there is a ‘link between joy and forgetfulness’ or ‘mindlessness’ (2001: 10), but claims that 
enchantment, understood as ‘a condition of exhilaration’ is at the core of the ‘affective 
dimensions of ethics’ (2001: 3) that can propel both ethical concern and action. Bennett 
crucially insists that the ‘capacity to give and receive surprises, an ability Deleuze described 
as becoming-otherwise’ (2001: 166), engenders ethical generosity which allows us to 
perceive the present as ‘congealed potentiality’ and to recognize that even though all 
human and non-human matter is restricted by mortality and finitude, it still has the capacity 
for ‘radical novelty’ (2001: 163). According to Bennett, we tend to experience these forms of 
enchantment at the ‘the borders between humans and animals between organisms and 
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machines, as well as those places where one confronts the perplexing, almost 
overwhelming, degree of complexity’ (2001: 169). The cultural re-presentations of artificial 
beings have long been situated at these borders that engender a sense of disturbing wonder 
and uncanny enchantment. Holograms, or rather, the optical effects and characteristics 
associated with holograms that have become grafted onto an expanding range of digital 
technologies (CGI), add a spectral quality, combining the perfect simulacrum and replica of 
reality with the sublime aura of mystery and the utopian hopes of a future characterised by 
advanced technology.v As such they inhabit a complex temporality, in that they are used to 
resurrect the past and reimagine the future.  
While K’s final reaction to Joi’s holographic billboard suggests despair and 
resignation, the audiences of Blade Runner 2049 are invited to acknowledge Joi’s 
multifaceted manifestations which are able to inspire the whole emotional spectrum 
between pure pleasure and utter desolation. The question is not so much if Joi really 
manages to self-actualize beyond her programming, what the film highlights is that as the 
alluring object she creates enchantment as well as disenchantment. When she leaves the 
confines of the flat and flies with K over Los Angeles, she marvels at the beatific waste 
surrounding Los Angeles’ sea wall.vi Joi does not only provoke but also displays a complex 
range of emotional reactions: when she is ‘upgraded’ (uploaded onto the ‘emanator’) which 
enables her for the first time to ‘free roam’, to leave the confines of K’s flat, she stands in 
the rain on the roof-top of his grubby apartment block and the spectator is invited to read 
her response as visceral joy. K and Joi can now co-inhabit a shared reality that conquers the 
physical spaces outside the flat. No longer bound to a spatially fixed device, Joi becomes 
part of the world which suggests increased sensory participation. To all appearances she 
revels in the new sensation of feeling water on her skin and yet she has no body that would 
enable her to have this sensual experience: the spectator can witness the raindrops on her 
hand, see her drenched in rain, but at the same time the raindrops pass right through her 
(causing a kind of electric current/shimmer). She exists in an irreconcilable state of being in 
which she has embodied feelings and yet she has no body, in which K touches her and yet 
cannot touch her because she is ethereal.  
This enhancement of Joi’s ability to experience the world and be experienced, is an 
empowerment that is facilitated, shaped and limited by the emanator supplied by the 
Wallace Cooperation, the same technology provider who is responsible for her initial 
programming. Her upgrade is not only driven by a capitalist agenda, even worse, ‘the 
system’s desire for new sources of profit [is] presented as complimentary and even 
codependent [… with the] emancipatory desire of individuals for dealienation’ (Snake-
Beings, 2013: 6). That does not necessarily mean that nothing can subvert this agenda; Joi 
might be a product of commercial interests and algorithms in the service of a neo-liberal 
logic, but while this is undoubtedly the sine qua non of her existence, it does not 
predetermine the outcome of every interaction she has. Her volumetric display performs an 
embodied experience of transition from one state of being to another, to a ‘higher stage in 
the capacities to act, associate and deploy oneself in or with one’s environment’ (Hage, 
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2002: 152) which Spinoza defined as the essence of joy, and yet her words are the generic 
response of a wind-up doll: ‘I am so happy when I am with you’. K’s reply (‘You don’t have to 
say that’) tries to initiate a form of interaction that transcends Joi’s programming, an 
interaction based on creative play in which Joi/y doesn’t necessarily equal happiness.  
What K – and with him the spectator – are asked to attest to is that Joi/y might be 
paradoxical: she is part of K’s self and yet ‘other’, she creates illusion and disillusionment, 
she is not, strictly speaking, alive, and yet she can die. She might be fantasmatic but she is 
not illusory, for K she occupies the potential space of fantasy, play and imagination. Joi 
might have been intended by her makers, the Wallace Corporation, as an illusion machine 
that, just like his implanted designer memories, keeps customers like K from rebelling 
against their exploitation and tied to escapist flights of fantasy. Even so, it is through play 
that K and Joi enact not only staple fantasies but work through the traumatic kernel at the 
centre of the diegesis. In play they create a transitional space that acknowledges both their 
harsh reality (of loss, finitude and death) and their own imaginative and creative agency. 
Together they produce a meaningful account of the trauma, a fiction that combines 
elements of the reality they are dealing with (the death of the mother and the 
abandonment of the child) with collective cultural myths (the notion of the chosen one) and 
their own anxieties and desires (to be seen and recognized as unique and special). Even 
though this fiction is built on a memory (the traumatic kernel) that is true and at the same 
time not true – based on a real experience but not experienced by K, it is a screen memory 
intended to obscure the ‘truth’ – it still enables K to produce a meaningful narrative that 
transcends his role of the passive witness to trauma. He gains ethical agency by deciding to 
safe Deckard (rather than kill him as was his mission) and reunite him with his daughter Ana. 
The last thing the concept of ‘working through’ trauma, or, in its collective version, a 
coming to terms with a difficult collective past (Vergangenheitsbewältigung) seems to 
suggest, is the activity of play. Those terms indicate a struggle that inevitably requires effort 
and can only be achieved against resistance (both one’s own and one’s environment). 
Remembering as a form of play, on the other hand, and its connection to imagination and 
creativity, has been thoroughly underexplored, at least in the context of memory studies. It 
can be traced, however, through the tradition of psychoanalysis back to Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920) and the description of his grandson’s ‘fort-da’ game.vii It is a 
repeated performance through which little Ernst learns to understand that his mother has 
only left for a certain time and will return in the near future, fostering his resilience and his 
ability to distinguish between the past (when her comforting presence was available to 
him), the present (when he has to tolerate temporary discomfort or even despair) and the 
future (when she will most likely return to look after his needs). His play acknowledges the 
(painful) reality of his mother as a separate object that he cannot control, at the same time 
creating a meaningful, symbolic representation through which he does not simply re-enact 
her dis- and reappearance but exerts his own agency.  
Object-relations psychoanalysis and in particular D.W. Winnicott in Playing and 
Reality (1971) have built on this by exploring the relational aspects of child’s play as a form 
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of reaching-out that is reflected back by the other. According to Winnicott, playing enacts a 
negotiation, a potential (or transitional) space between inner world and external, shared 
reality (i.e. out of the child’s control) as a place of creative connectedness. This in-
betweenness marks a ‘time of transition and a space of transaction’ (Burgin, 2013: 26). The 
transitional object is simultaneously brought into being by an imaginative, internal act and a 
real object that exists in the external world. The play with this object and with different 
potentialities helps the child negotiate and transition between inner experience and the 
external world. K and Joi engage in this form of therapeutic play in which Joi takes on the 
role of a comforting ‘transitional object’, at the same time found and created, part of K’s 
inner psychical reality and also part of the physical world. Their play initially remains in the 
confines of make-believe, the safe pleasures of cultural cliché and (somewhat outdated) 
conventions of romantic fantasy and marital bliss. K hesitantly begins to invest in the 
escapist fantasy of being the first child born to a replicant which leads him to subvert the 
rules of his enslaved existence, while Joi embraces her precarious status as a single data set 
on a fragile device. They both navigate the limitations of their realities and the constraints 
of their existence and they both strive, each in their own way, to overcome them by 
becoming truly alive. As this results in both K’s and Joi’s death, it could be read as evidence 
of the kind of cruel optimism Berlant is referring to. And yet, it is the replicants’ desire to go 
beyond what has been anticipated by their creators – an as yet unknown future that has 
become embodied in Rachel’s child – that turns them into relational beings and connects 
them to somebody else. It is play that violates their ‘baseline’ and algorithmic programming 
and that makes them come alive. Here, consciousness is not so much created through 
trauma but through the process of meaning-making, through storytelling, through the 
cultural experience that ‘begins with creative living first manifested in play’ (Winnicott, 
2005: 135). At the same time the potential or transitional space that is thereby created also 
becomes an ethical space because it allows the individual to acknowledge a harsh reality 
and the fallibility of the other while still relying on one’s agency and ability to imagine and 
create a different future. 
 
‘Memory Play’ 
Different concepts in memory studies (such as collective, cultural, social or mediated 
memory) refer to the phenomenon that we construct ‘shared memories’ through cultural 
experience, and yet the crucial role of relational play has not yet been explored in that 
context to any extent. The following is my attempt to start to think about the role of play in 
the creation of a collectively ‘shared memory’ and the role of memory in the creation of a 
transitional or potential space, identified by Winnicott as ‘the location of cultural 
experience’ (Winnicott, 2005: 128). How do playful acts of film spectating rely on ‘acts of 
memory’ in the specific case of Blade Runner 2049?   
First and foremost, the film conjures up fans’ memories of the 1982 film: reviewers 
have remarked on the many visual and aural quotations of the original in Roger Deakins’ 
cinematography, the set design and – probably most powerful and evocative – the literal 
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echoes of the original’s iconic blending of music and soundscape.viii Deep drum hits from the 
original musical score by Vangelis were recreated and ‘used to “sting” important dramatic 
beats’ (Blake, 2018: 34). The intradiegetic ambient sounds of the Blade Runner world, the 
sometimes subtle but always distinct hissing, roaring, ringing or whooshing sounds made by 
its machines, flying cars and optical devices, lay a trail of aural traces that evoke an almost 
Proustian flashback to the experience of watching the prequel. But apart from a sense of 
shared sensory memories that evoke an unqualified affective response of recognition in 
fans, Blade Runner 2049 also engages in a knowingly playful back-and-forth with its fan 
audience. The 1982 Blade Runner has gained cult status and produced a wealth of fan 
theories, speculations and interpretations, disseminated in blogs, forums and fan fiction, the 
most enduring of which is the debate whether Deckard was in fact a replicant himself.ix 
Blade Runner 2049 takes up these discussions and spins them further, but in doing so it 
refrains from providing definite answers and thereby invites fans to respond in an ongoing 
open game of creative reading in which the film(s) are not so much envisaged as authored 
and finished cultural products but as a fluid, relational experiences that constantly change 
over time.  
In a climactic moment in the film, the sequel touches on the long-standing question 
if Deckard is a replicant: Wallace has kidnapped Deckard to find the child of his union with 
Rachel and tries to pressurize and seduce him into giving up the vital information. He plays 
Deckard an audio-file of his first encounter with Rachel (a distorted fragment that survived 
the Blackout) and triggers Deckard’s memory which the film visualizes for the audience in a 
replay of the scene from the original movie. In this case the metaphor of memory as a film 
clip is taken literally and the audience partake in both the character Deckard’s and their own 
memory through film. But Wallace’s and the director’s power go further: they cannot only 
evoke Rachel in mediated form (as audio or visual trace) or conjure her up in Deckard’s or 
the spectator’s own internal space (their personal memory); Wallace and the film director 
resurrect Rachel as the alluring object for both Deckard and the audience: in the diegesis 
through cloning, in the visual effects of the movie through a highly sophisticated digital 
double.x Therefore Wallace’s question to Deckard could also be directed to the spectator: ‘Is 
it the same, now, as then? The moment you met her. All these years you looked back on 
that day, drunk on the memory of its perfection ... how shiny her lips ... how instant your 
connection. Did it never occur to you that was why you were summoned in the first place? 
Designed to do nothing short of fall for her right then and there. All to make that single 
perfect ... specimen.’ This perfect specimen, the child Ana, is not only the result of Rachel’s 
and Deckard’s union, she is also the memory maker, the designer of prosthetic memories, 
fed by her own imagination.xi  
Just like Deckard himself, the audience is being encouraged to consciously 
remember and question their investment in the alluring object, which, in the case of the 
latter, is the movie itself. Wallace insinuates that Deckard’s and Rachel’s relationship (just 
like that between Joi and K or the spectator and the movie) is not so much based on ‘free 
play’ but turns out to be a rather crude manipulation for commercial purposes. But Deckard 
 13 
resists both, Wallace’s attempt to make him succumb to sentimental and ‘restorative’ 
nostalgia (Boym, 2001: XVIII) just as much as his cruel efforts to disillusion Deckard’s 
memory of his connection with Rachel; instead he insists: ‘I know what is real […] Her eyes 
were green’. This seems like an odd remark unless one takes into account that his response 
is not just a rejection of Wallace’s creation but an invitation to fan audiences to play: a 
minor thread of fan discussions revolves around the question of the true colour of Rachel’s 
eyes.xii  While Sean Young, the actress who played Rachel, clearly had brown eyes, the 
crucial scene in the original Blade Runner’s Voight-Kampff test, in which the dilation of her 
pupils determines if she is a replicant, show her with green eyes. These inconsistencies, gaps 
and blanks have long been an inspiration for meaning-making and co-writing for the fan 
community (was it only a continuity error? was it deliberate? what does it mean?). And 
again, Blade Runner 2049 does not attempt to lay these questions at rest, but takes them up 
to reflect them back to a fan community to encourage an ongoing creative engagement with 
the films and their fictional worlds:xiii did Deckard misremember? Did he lie to Wallace? And 
if so, was this lie motivated by his resistance to Wallace’s emotional seduction and his 
refusal to give in to a sentimental form of nostalgia that would endanger his daughter’s 
present and future and allow the Wallace Corporation to identify and exploit her? In fact, 
the sequel does not assume any prescriptive authority over ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and instead 
presents its own and others’ productive misremembering as a way of constructing a 
meaningful dialogical narrative that resides neither solely in the heads of audience members 




There have been efforts to understand joyful remembering not necessarily as sentimental 
and ‘restorative’ nostalgia (Boym, 2001: XVIII) but as a trigger for spontaneous and creative 
play, as emergent, fluid and future directed. And if we accept that play, creativity and the 
power of the imagination can energize people to create alternative fictions and scenarios 
for the future that transcend the ‘knowable version of the same’ (Bennett, 2001: 77), this 
has consequences for the methodologies in memory studies. It means that we need to 
recognise and explore memory play as an alternative mode of recall and remembrance as 
well as a potentially vital part of ‘memory activism’. Bennet argues that ethics require a 
moral code and the capacity and willingness for critical demystification but also an 
embodied sensibility and affective energy to perform and enact it. The argument that we do 
not only need a conscience but also the motivation to act on it is certainly true, and 
psychologists such as van der Kolk describe joy, in contrast to trauma, as enabling rather 
than disabling. However, understood as pure affect, joy itself is without meaning, it is simply 
an intensity, a force. What seems essential, therefore, in our conceptualising of collective 
processes of remembering, is not to see either trauma or joy as having any ethical value in 
and of themselves, but to start to explore memory as a potentially joyful cultural experience 
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that can help us facilitate creative play, tolerate unresolved ambiguity and envision 
alternative futures. 
 
i In the preface to the 2014 volume on the Future of Trauma Theory, Rothberg declared the prism of trauma as 
‘necessary but not sufficient’ (2014: xiv). 
ii Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) became an official psychiatric diagnosis in 1980, when it was first 
included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 
iii Winnicott always used the term potential space but it is frequently referred to by commentators as 
transitional space to emphasise its link to the transitional object.  
iv After ‘recovering’ this memory, Blade Runner K fails his ‘post-traumatic baseline test’ which he has to pass 
every time he ‘retires’, i.e. kills, an old Nexus 8 replicant.  
v As metaphors for futures that never came to be, for example as cultural icons in the Star Wars franchise 
(1977-2019, dir. George Lucas), holograms inspire todays physicists to emulate the way the future was 
envisaged in the past. Cp. Elizabeth Gibney (2018) Physicists create Star Wars-style 3D projections — just don’t 
call them holograms. In: Nature. International Journal of Science https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-
018-01125-y (accessed 22 September 2018). 
vi In that she echoes the dying replicant’s ‘Tears in rain’ monologue at the end of Blade Runner (1982). 
Approaching the end of his life-span, Batty saves Deckard from certain death, even though he was sent to 
terminate him. But before Batty dies, he shares these memories of his experience of wonder: ‘I've seen things 
you people wouldn't believe. Attack ships on fire off the shoulder of Orion. I watched C-beams glitter in the 
dark near the Tannhäuser Gate. All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. Time to die.’ 
vii Freud observed his grandson Ernst (aged eighteen months) repeatedly throwing away and retrieving a 
wooden reel using an attached string. Freud interpreted the game as a way to work through the child’s 
experience of an overwhelming, terrifying and irreparable loss which is gradually overcome through the 
repetition in play, in fictional make-believe. 
viii For example, Stephanie Zacharek (2017) Blade Runner 2049 Is Visually Stunning and Excessively Faithful to 
the Original. In: Time.com, 29 September, 1 and Larry Blake (2018) Effects Become Music. Creating the Sound 
of Blade Runner 2049. In: mixonline.com, January, 32-34. 




rue/> (all accessed on 22 September 2018). 
x Cp. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x8ZnqCKZABY (accessed 22 September 2018). 
xi Ana is a freelance designer for the Wallace Corporation, a ‘memory maker’, creating fake memories to be 
implanted into replicants. When K asks her ‘what makes your memories so authentic?’, she responds: ‘There is 
a bit of every artist in their work. I was locked in this sterile chamber at eight. So if I wanted to see the world I 
had to imagine it. Got very good at imagining …’. 
xii Cp. one of many examples https://movies.stackexchange.com/questions/81712/in-blade-runner-2049-why-
does-deckard-say-rachel-had-green-eyes (accessed 22 September 2018).  
xiii The director Denis Villeneuve describes himself in one of his promotional interviews for Blade Runner 2049 
as a super-fan of the original film, ‘he estimates he saw it as a young man in Quebec “at least 1,000 times”. 
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